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I. Introduction
A well-documented finding internationally is that men who are married earn
significantly more than men who are not married, even aftier controlling for
differences in the observable characteristics of these men. The reasons for the
marital earnings premium have been explored extensively in the literature
over the past 30 years. The two main and competing explanations are the
productivity hypothesis (marriage makes men more productive and therefore
they earn more than other men) and the selection hypothesis (men who are
selected into marriage are those men who would also do better in the labor
market). To control for selection on the basis of time-invariant individual
attributes, studies have generally used panel data to estimate fixed effects
models. Typically this is found to reduce the size of the marital earnings
premium, indicating that selection into marriage does matter. But in most
studies, a positive and significant earnings premium to marriage persists. The
remaining differential is interpreted as the "returns" to marriage, and much
of the literature then explores why marriage would increase men's productivity.
Although fixed effects estimation techniques remove the problem of indi-
vidual heterogeneity, they do not control for another source of endogeneity
bias in the earnings estimation. If men with faster earnings growth are pos-
itively selected into marriage, then the fixed effects estimator will continue
to overstate any real gains to marriage. Few studies in the literature refer to
this possibility, but those that do find no evidence of such selection.
This study investigates the nature of the marital earnings premium among
black men in South Africa. What makes a study of the marital earnings
premium in South Africa particularly interesting is the payment of bride wealth
(known as ilobolo) to validate a traditional marriage. If ilobolo payments are a
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constraint to marriage, then we might expect to find evidence of selection
into marriage not only on the basis of unobservable attributes but also on the
basis of high earnings growth. Men who experience faster earnings growth,
for example, may be able to accumulate iloholo payments more quickly than
men whose permanent income is the same but whose earnings grow more
slowly over a comparable period of employment.
We use the September 2004 Labor Force Survey to show that a robust
marital earnings premium exists for black men in cross-sectional regressions
and to compare the premium for marriage and cohabitation. To investigate
the selection of men into marriage, we use the six waves of the recently released
Labor Force Survey Panel from 2001 to 2004, the first national panel of this
kind available in South Africa. We find that the marital earnings premium
falls considerably when we control for individual fixed effects. Furthermore,
we show that among unmarried men, earnings growth is positively related to
the probability of marriage in the subsequent years of the panel, suggesting
that the fixed effects estimator may still have upward bias.
In the next section, we summarize the literature on the marital earnings
premium, and in Section III we describe the practice of bride wealth in South
Africa. We analyze the marital earnings premium using cross-sectional data
in Section IV. In Section V, we investigate the quality of available panel data
in South Africa, and we test for the selection effects of marriage. The last
section summarizes our key empirical findings.
I I . Explanations for the Marital Earnings Premium
Since the 1980s, a growing body of literature, predominantly from the United
States, has developed to account for the common finding that married men
earn significantly more on average than men who are not married. A robust
marital earnings differential has been found to exist even after controlling for
observable differences between married and unmarried men. Estimates of the
conditional marriage premium have generally ranged between 10% and 30%,
comparable in size to the race and union wage differentials in the United
States, for example (Korenman and Neumark 1991).
Two main hypotheses have emerged to explain the marital earnings pre-
mium. The dominant theory, which draws on Becker's (1965, 1981) model
of household time allocation, is that marriage makes men more productive.
Marriage allows for economies of scale in home production and the speciali-
zation of labor, with men traditionally specializing in market activities and
women in home production. Married men will therefore have greater oppor-
tunities to accumulate human capital in market activities than single men,
thereby increasing their productivity and wages.
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The competing hypothesis (Nakosteen and Zimmer 1987) is that men who
are married would have done better in the labor market regardless of their
marital status. In other words, there is a selection of men into marriage based
on unobservable individual characteristics that are also rewarded in the labor
market and that translate into higher wages. Rodgers and Stratton (2005, 6)
provide an extensive list of personal traits that might be valued in both the
marriage and labor markets: ability, attitude, self-esteem, congeniality, loyalty,
honesty, dependability, leadership, industriousness, and even physical appear-
ance.
Attempts to control for selection into marriage have included estimating
cross-sectional earnings equations in a two-stage Heckman selection model
(Nakosteen and Zimmer 1987); using twin or sibling data to control for
genetic and/or family endowments (Loh 1996; Antonovics and Town 2004);
and, most often, using panel data on individuals to control for time-invariant
unobservable characteristics in a fixed effects model (Korenman and Neumark
1991; Cornwell and Rupert 1997; Gray 1997; Hersch and Stratton 2000;
Stratton 2002; Rodgers and Stratton 2005; Ahituv and Lerman 2007).
The general consensus that emerges from this empirical literature is that
selection into marriage matters—but not that much. Regardless of the data
or methodology used, a mostly consistent finding is that, even though ac-
counting for selection may reduce the marriage premium, a substantial portion
remains. Selection effects are typically found to be responsible for less than
20% of the premium (Stratton 2002).
Another possible selection mechanism at play, referred to by only a few
studies, derives from the endogeneity of marriage in a dynamic context. If
men with faster wage growth are more likely to get married, then this selection
effect would not be controlled for in a fixed effects model. To test for whether
the change in marital status is endogenous, Korenman and Neumark (1991)
and Gray (1997) look at whether single men, who have faster wage growth
in a preceding period, are more likely to get married in a later period. However,
neither study finds evidence of such endogeneity.
Given that a substantial portion of the marriage premium cannot be ex-
plained by selection effects, a large part of the international literature focuses
on trying to uncover the nature or causes of the productivity effect. Here the
evidence is more mixed. Controlling for the number of years married, Ko-
renman and Neumark (1991), Gray (1997), and Stratton (2002) find that
wages continue to grow at a faster rate throughout the marriage. This is taken
as evidence of specialization occurring over the course of the marriage. However,
the results in Cornwell and Rupert (1997) and Hersch and Stratton (2000)
imply that the benefits of marriage are better described by an intercept shift
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rather than a steeper earnings slope for married men. Cornwell and Rupert
(1997, 292) suggest that "such a shift in the wage-generating process might
be regarded as the effect of 'settling down'—a kind of structural break in-
volving adjustments in market work and homework in the move from single
to married life." Ahituv and Lerman's (2007) study suggests a combination
of an intercept effect in hours worked and a slope effect in wage rates: marriage
quickly increases hours worked but the effect on wage rates occurs over time
as marriage continues.
Other attempts at understanding the causal mechanism driving the pro-
ductivity effect have involved using hours worked by the wife as a proxy for
specialization in the household. The prediction is that married men whose
wives work longer hours will earn less than married men whose wives work
fewer hours or who do not work at all. Gray (1997) and Chun and Lee (2001)
find the expected wage penalty for married men whose wives work or work
longer hours. In Jacobsen and Rayack (1996), however, the premium on being
married to a full-time housewife does not survive the endogeneity correction,
suggesting that wives may adjust their working hours in response to their
husbands' wages.' As a more direct measure of specialization, Hersch and
Stratton (2000) use the actual time spent on housework by men, but they
find only a marginally significant negative effect of this variable on earnings
and little change to the marriage premium itself.
A third explanation for the marriage premium considered in the literature,
although to a lesser extent, is employer favoritism. Employers may discriminate
against unmarried men (or married men whose wives work) because of a
perceived lower need or because of a preference for men who adhere to certain
social norms. But evidence of a wage premium also for self-employed married
men casts doubt on this hypothesis (Jacobsen and Rayack 1996).
III. Bride Wealth and the Marital Earnings Premium in South Africa
The studies reviewed in the previous section examined the relationship between
marital status and earnings among men in developed countries. In this study,
we investigate evidence of a marital earnings premium among black men in
a country where bride wealth traditionally is practiced, and where we may
Jacobsen and Rayack (1996) and Loh (1996) even find some evidence that working wives may
have a positive effect on men's earnings, implying that either complementarities in household time
allocation or positive assortative mating may be at play. Similar evidence has been found for the
United Kingdom—while Blackaby, Carlin, and Murphy (1998) found a significant negative re-
lationship between wife's working hours and men's wages for some occupations in the early 1980s,
a decade later they found that this penalty had been replaced by a premium, albeit small, for
almost all occupations (Blackaby, Carlin, and Murphy 2007).
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therefore expect selection to be a more important parr of the explanation for
the marriage premium.
In South Africa, ilobolo is paid by a prospective husband to the bride's family
to validate a customary marriage. Historically, this payment was in the form
of cattle (commonly 11 cows) and was substantial enough to require that men
left their homesteads to engage in "long periods of wage labor" (Hunter 2004,
132). In more recent years, the custom oí ilobolo has changed in that cash has
replaced cattle as a means of payment. However, research suggests that the
payment of ilobolo remains a significant hurdle to marriage and is a key reason
for why marriage rates are lower, and mean age at marriage is higher, among
black South Africans than among other population groups (Budlender, Cho-
bokoane, and Simelane 2004; Hunter 2004).
National household surveys in South Africa do not collect information on
the payment of ilobolo. However, information collected in the 1998 wave of
a regionally based panel study (the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study)
gives some indication of the extent to which ilobolo is still practiced and its
value. Of the 725 married respondents aged 60 years or younger in the sample,
three-quarters (542) reported ilobolo payments with marriage. Payment typi-
cally involved a combination of cash, cattle, and other livestock: about 68%
reported that the ilobolo payment included cash; 75% reported payments of
cattle and a further 13% of other livestock.
The average value oí ilobolo reported for people married from 1985 to 1998
was approximately 20,000 Rands in 2000 prices^ (or almost 13 times the
average monthly real earnings of black men in the 1998 sample). The full
payment oí ilobolo typically preceded marriage, but almost 30% of respondents
(159/542) reported that some portion had been, or was still, owing after
marriage.
The practice and value of bride wealth suggests that selection may account
for a larger portion of the marital earnings premium in South Africa than has
been found in studies of the United States, for example. First, we would
predict that men with unobservable qualities that are valued in the labor
market will be more able to afford ilobolo and get married. We would therefore
expect a large fall in the cross-sectional marriage premium when we control
for individual fixed effects.
Second, while little evidence of the endogeneity of changes in marital status
has been found in the international literature, we might expect a dynamic
selection problem for South Africa; if the payment of ilobolo is a constraint to
^ This value is consistent with reports in the literature of iloholo typically ranging from 10,000
Rands to 25,000 Rands (Kaarsholm 2005; Gustafsson and Worku 2006).
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marriage, then men with higher earnings growth may be more likely to marry.
There are a number of possible reasons for this. Men with higher earnings
growth would be able to accumulate iloholo at a faster rate than men with the
same present value of lifetime earnings but whose earnings grow at a slower
rate over a comparable period of employment. They therefore could be more
likely to get married or to be identified as a viable marriage partner. Faster
wage growth may also allow men to borrow more easily against future earnings
to pay for ilobolo. If changes in marital status are endogenous to changes in
earnings, then the marriage coefficient derived from a fixed effects model will
still overestimate the true returns to marriage.
Third, we would anticipate significant differences for men who marry and
those who cohabit with their partners. A small part of the international lit-
erature on the marital earnings premium investigates whether there is an
earnings premium also for cohabitation. The expectation is that a premium
would exist but that it would be smaller than that found for married men.
This is because a cohabiting relationship is likely to be less stable and to
involve less specialization (as financial responsibilities are generally shared more
equally between the partners). Both Loh (1996) and Stratton (2002) find a
significant earnings premium for men who cohabit in the United States and
also find that the size of the premium is roughly half that for married men,
as expected.
Although cohabitation generally can be seen as a middle-class choice in
most developed countries, in South Africa it seems to be more prevalent among
the poor (Budlender et al. 2004). In their study of marriage patterns in South
Africa, Budlender et al. (2004) highlight that cohabitation is more common
among blacks than among the other population groups. If cohabitation among
black couples is a second-best strategy for those who cannot afford to get
married, then we would anticipate a far lower earnings premium, if any, for
men who cohabit.
IV. Analysis of the Marital Premium at the Cross Section
A. Data and Sample
We start the study of the male marital earnings premium in South Africa
using cross-sectional data from the September 2004 Labor Force Survey (LFS
2004:2), collected by the national statistical agency (Statistics South Africa).
The LFS 2004:2 sampled almost 30,000 households, of which approximately
76% (or 21,761 households) were classified as black. We choose this nationally
representative data set both because it collects comprehensive labor market
information and because, in contrast to the earlier Labor Force Surveys, the
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question on marital status distinguishes between marriage and cohabitation.'
Like all national household surveys in South Africa, however, there is very
little information collected explicitly on marriage. In contrast to the data sets
used in the United States, for example, there are no questions asked about
the length of marriage or about time spent on housework. There is also no
background information collected, for example, on the education of respon-
dents' parents, which could be used to instrument for marriage.
In table 1, we compare the mean characteristics of employed men by four
categories of marital status: currently married, cohabiting, previously married
(divorced or widowed), and never married. In 2004, approximately 44% of
the sample of employed men older than 20 years was married, 18% reported
cohabiting with their partner, and a further 4% was previously married. The
remaining 34% reported never being married."
Average hourly earnings are highest among married men and considerably
lower among men who are cohabiting with their partners or men who have
never married. Table 1 also describes differences in the observable characteristics
of these samples of employed men. On average, men who are married are older
than never married men and men who cohabit, but they are younger than
men who have been previously married. Married men are also more likely
than all other men to report postmatric (i.e., tertiary) education.
A larger proportion of married men lives with children, but particularly
older children (aged 7—14 years). For children younger than 7 years, there is
little difference between married and cohabiting men, a finding consistent
with current research that identifies a large proportion of children born outside
of (customary or civil) marriage in South Africa (see Gustafsson and Worku
2006).
B. Estimation
We use a standard Mincerian earnings equation and ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimation to test for evidence of a male marital earnings premium with
the cross-sectional sample. The dependent variable is the log of hourly earnings
There is some concern about the reliability of information provided by respondents reporting on
marital status in household questionnaires (see Budlender et al. 2004). In particular, Budlender et
al. (2004) suggest that among blacks cohabitation may be underreported both because some
cohabitors may not be willing to acknowledge that they are not married and because "the term is
often misunderstood, especially when translated into different languages" (Budlender et al. 2004,
5). Nonetheless, we find that the data on marriage and living together are generally consistent,
with clear and expected differences between the two groups of men (and similar findings are
reported in Budlender et al. 2004, 23).
In contrast, among a comparable sample of white men, about 75% were married (1,090/1,451)
and only 6% were cohabiting with a partner.
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF EMPLOYED BLACK MEN IN SOUTH AFRICA, 2004
Hourly earnings








Living in a metropolitan area
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Source. Labor Force Survey 2004:2.
Note. The sample is restricted to employed men older than 20 years for whom a complete set of
observations is available. All individuals who reported hours usually worked in excess of 140 hours per
week or as zero, although employed, are dropped from the sample. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
), the independent variables include a vector of marital status dummy
variables (M,) as well as a vector of other observable individual and job char-
acteristics (x,), and e, is the error term:
7) = a + 7/VÍ,. + /3X,. + £;. (1)
Table 2 reports the results from three regressions across which the number of
covariates is progressively increased. In the simplest estimation (I), three mar-
ital status indicators are included (with never married as the omitted category),
and a quadratic in age. Men who are married are estimated to earn 54% more,
on average, than men who have not married. In contrast, men who cohabit
are estimated to earn less than never married men, although the coefficient is
small and only weakly significant.
When additional regressors are included in the regression, the size of the
marital earnings premium declines considerably, but it remains large and
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TABLE 2












































































Note. The sample is restricted to men older than 20 years. The weighted regressions
control for clustering and stratification in sample design. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. The omitted marital status and education categories are "never married"
and "no schooling," respectively. All regressions include nine dummy variables for province
of residence; and estimation III further includes nine occupation and 11 industry dummies
that are not reported here.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
significant. The nnarriage effect falls to 0.35 (ot a premium of 42%) when we
control for levels of educational attainment in regression II, and to 0.21 (a
premium of 23%) when occupation and industry categories are included in
regression III. In contrast, the cohabitation effect disappears with controls for
education.'
' The marital earnings premium remains large and significant for different minimum age thresholds
defining our sample, and it even increases for men older than 35 (from 0.208 to 0.267). Because
we cannot control for years married, this increase may reflect the effects of longer marriages among
older men. We also controlled for whether or not a married man's spouse was resident in the
household, but this had no effect on these earnings estimations. About 18% of our sample of
employed men who report being married also report their spouse not currently resident in the
household. The obvious explanation for this is the temporary (or circular) labor migration of either
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A substantial earnings premium for men who have been married before is
also identified in the regressions. The premium to men who are either divorced
or widowed is estimated at 0.185 (or 20.3%), only slightly lower than the
premium to men who are currently married. As in the case of currently married
men, this premium would be consistent with either productivity or selection
mechanisms. Productivity benefits may have accrued to men over the course
of their former marriage; and men with characteristics that are valued in the
labor market may be more likely to have been married earlier in their lives.
Another possible explanation for the marital earnings premium is that
employers discriminate in favor of married men. We test this possibility by
estimating the marriage effect separately for men with wage employment and
for men in self-employment. If a primary source of the premium derives from
employer favoritism, then we would expect no (or a significantly smaller)
marriage effect for the self-employed. The results presented in table 3, however,
show that this is not the case: among the self-employed, men who are married
are estimated to earn about 29% more on average than men with similar
observable characteristics, and in the same occupational category and industry,
but who have not married. The premium is also higher than that among the
wage employed (22%), although the standard error is considerably bigger.
Similar results are found among men who are divorced or widowed.
Our estimates of the marital earnings differential in South Africa are larger
than cross-sectional estimates reported in studies for the United States: in
regressions that use comparable specifications, the estimated marriage effect
mostly lies between 0.09 and 0.11 (Korenman and Neumark 1991; Loh 1996;
Gray 1997; Chun and Lee 2001; Ahituv and Lerman 2007). In contrast to
other studies (Loh 1996; Stratton 2002), we also find no evidence of a positive
cohabitation effect.
However, our cross-sectional estimates of the marriage premium may be
biased upward, first because of the omission of unobserved time-invariant
variables that affect outcomes in both the marriage and the labor market, and
second because changes in marital status may not be exogenous to changes in
earnings. Our ability to address these problems in the cross section is greatly
limited by the availability of appropriate instruments in the LFS 2004:2. We
therefore turn to a less detailed, and therefore somewhat "cruder," data set
but one that permits fixed effects analysis using panel data.
the husband or the wife (see, e.g., Posel and Cásale 2006). We found a comparable marital earnings
premium ( = 0.193) when married men in the sample are restricted to those with resident spouses.
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TABLE 3
ESTIMATED EARNINGS REGRESSIONS FOR BLACK MEN






























































Note. The sample is restricted to men older than 20 years. The weighted
regressions control for clustering and stratification in sample design. Ro-
bust standard errors are in parentheses. The omitted marital status and
education categories are "never married" and "no schooling," respec-
tively. The estimations also include nine province dummy variables, nine
occupation, and 11 industry dummies, which are not reported here.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
* * * Significant at the 1% level.
V. Selection and the Marital Earnings Premium
A. Data and Sample
Two possible sources of panel data in South Africa are the KwaZulu-Natal
Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) and the Labor Force Survey (LFS) Panel. The
KIDS data, collected over three waves from 1993 to 2004 for one of South
Africa's nine provinces, KwaZulu-Natal, potentially offer a rich source of
information because questions have been asked about the payment of bride
wealth or ilobolo. However, these questions have only been included in one
wave of the panel (in 1998). Also, and more restrictive for our study, com-
prehensive labor market information is not collected consistently for the em-
ployed, marriage and cohabitation are not distinguished, and it is difficult to
interpret the marital status information collected. In a fixed effects analysis.
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we are also limited by a very small number of individuals who changed marital
status over the panel.*
An alternative data set is the LFS Panel of 2001-4, made available by
Statistics South Africa in January 2007 and the first source of national panel
data in the country. Although the biannual LFSs are released as cross-sectional
data sets, the survey is designed as a rotating panel, with a 20% rotation of
dwelling units planned in each wave. The LFS Panel therefore consists of a
subset of individuals living in those dwelling units that were matched across
six waves of the LFS, from September 2001 to March 2004 (in September
2004 a new master sample was drawn).' The advantages of these panel data
for our study are that detailed labor market information is collected and the
sample is considerably larger than that for KIDS. In the sample of 12,568
employed black men in the panel, 1,549 individuals changed marital status.
Among the marriage switchers specifically, about 70% were from not married
to married, and 30% were from married to not married (i.e., to widowed,
divorced, or separated).
However, there are a number of limitations in the scope of the panel, and
in the nature of the information collected, which restrict our analysis. First,
the tracking unit for the panel is the dwelling place rather than the household,
and the panel therefore consists only of those individuals who stayed in the
same dwelling; individuals who left the dwelling could not have been matched
over time.' We therefore will not be identifying any change in marital status
that coincides also with a change in the dwelling place. Second, the unit of
analysis is the individual. No attempt has been made to link individuals to
household members who have remained coresident over time, and consequently,
there are no household-level variables that can be used in our study. Third,
Furthermore, of the 40 "switchers" out of a sample of about 500 employed black men in the
panel in 1993 and 1998, all were from not married to married, and fewer than half of these were
clearly first marriages, indicating potentially large measurement error.
Although the survey was conceptualized as having a 20% replacement of dwelling units in each
wave, in practice, a rotation rate of less than 20% occurred in some of the waves, so that a small
percentage of the total matched individuals (about 5%) remain in the panel for six waves, rather
than the expected five waves (more details can be found in Statistics South Africa 2006).
Statistics South Africa (2006) acknowledges also that because their matching procedures (both
manual and computerized) found many "mismatches," data were edited across the waves. Although
we found no inconsistencies in the age of our respondents across the waves of the panel, about 7%
of the sample "lost" years of schooling as the panel progressed. The majority of these inconsistencies
(about 70%) were heaped at matric (grade 12), suggesting that reporting on matriculation, in
particular, may be inflared. We assumed that a lower level of educational attainment, reported in
a subsequent wave of the panel, was the "true" level and we adjusted years of schooling downward
to match this level. Our results are robust also to dropping these mismatches from the sample or
to adjusting education upward in subsequent waves.
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TABLE 4




















































































Source. LFS 2001:2; LFS 2003:2; LFS Panel.
Note. The data are not weighted. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The sample is all men aged
20 years and older with employment. All individuals who reported hours usually worked in excess of
140 hours per week or as zero, although employed, are dropped from the sample.
no weights have been provided for the LFS Panel, and there is no obvious
way of generating these weights. It does not seem possible to link individuals
in the panel back to their information (both individual and household) in the
original cross-sectional LFS data sets, as unique identifiers have been replaced.
Fourth, and frustratingly for our particular study, the LFSs prior to September
2004, and therefore all the LFSs included in the panel, do not distinguish
between marriage and cohabitation.
In table 4, we compare the sample of employed men who were matched
in the panel with the full sample surveyed at the cross section, for September
2001 (or wave 1 of the panel) and September 2003 (wave 5 of the panel).
The differences in the average characteristics of the samples are not that large,
given the concerns raised above. However, because married or cohabiting men
are less likely than never married men to move from a dwelling, they are
overrepresented in the longitudinal data, and this obviously becomes more
pronounced over the course of the panel. Analogously, never married men who
are geographically more mobile are underrepresented in the longitudinal data.
We investigate further in table 5 whether the subsamples of married and
not married men remaining in the panel are different from the samples taken
from the LFS cross-sectional data. There is some evidence that both currently
and previously married men in the panel are more educated and more highly
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TABLE 5













































































































































Source. LFS 2001:2; LFS 2003:2; LFS Panel.
Note. The data are not weighted. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The sample is all men aged
20 years and older with employment. All individuals who reported hours usually worked in excess of
140 hours per week or as zero, although employed, are dropped from the sample.
paid on average than those in the cross-sectional sample, but the differences
are relatively small and statistically insignificant. The average characteristics
of never married men in the longitudinal sample are very similar to those in
the cross sections.
B. Estimation
We run two models to estimate the marital earnings premium using the LFS
Panel data set. First, to provide a benchmark for comparison, the panel struc-
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ture of the data is ignored and the six waves are simply pooled. We use OLS
to estimate the earnings equation:
In {\^,) = a + 7AI, + /3X, + Ô, + V,, (2)
where W¡, represents the hourly earnings of individual z in time t, Mj, is a
vector of marital status variables, Xi, is a vector of individual and employment-
related explanatory variables, o¡ is the time-invariant error capturing unob-
served individual-specific characteristics, and p¡, is the idiosyncratic or time-
varying error.
The pooled estimation ignores the possibility that Ô, may be positively
correlated with marriage if unobserved attributes valued in the labor market
are also valued in the marriage market. We control for these individual effects
in the second model by estimating the fixed effects or within transformation:
In (V(<) - In (Wf) = 7"'^ {M,, - M,) + ß"' (X, - X,) + v, - v,, (3)
where for any variable Q, Q¡ represents the mean value for individual i over
the / periods.
The two estimations are reported in table 6. To better gauge the nature of
the longitudinal sample, we also present the results of a pooled OLS regression
on the full sample of cross-sectional data from which the panel is drawn (that
is, the six surveys from September 2001 to March 2004). A comparison of
columns 1 and 2 shows little difference in the estimated coefficients across
the two sets of pooled samples. The coefficient on marriage is somewhat higher
for the matched sample from the LFS Panel (0.165 compared to 0.152), sug-
gesting that more highly paid married or cohabitating men may be less mobile
and therefore more likely to remain in the panel.^
In the fixed effects estimation, reported in column 3, the marriage effect
remains significant at the 5% level, but it falls by 60% of its value to a
' The estimates in table 6 of the divorced/widowed premium from the two pooled regressions are
much lower than the premium that was identified using the LFS 2004:2 cross section only in table
2 (0.081 and 0.086 compared to 0.185). Unlike our estimates of the marital earnings premium,
the estimated premium to divorced or widowed men is highly variable across the earlier years of
the LFS, with the premium being highest in the LFS 2004:2. Consequently, the comparable estimate
for divorced or widowed men based on the pooled data from 2001 to 2004 is significantly lower.
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TABLE 6






























































Source. LFS 2001:2; LFS 2002:1; LFS 2002:2; LFS 2003:1; LFS 2003:2; LFS 2004:1; LFS Panel (2001-4).
Note. The sample is restricted to employed black men older than 20 years. The data are not weighted.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The omitted marital status variable is "never married." All estimations
include nine occupation, 11 industry, and five wave (time) dummies. The estimations in cols. 1 and 2
also control for province of residence.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
premium of 6.7% (from 0.165 to 0.065).'° Although our cross-sectional es-
timates of the marital earnings premium are considerably larger than those
estimated in studies for the United States, the fixed effects estimate is very
similar (Korenman and Neumark 1991; Cornwell and Rupert 1997; Gray
1997; Ahituv and Lerman 2007), suggesting larger individual fixed effects in
the South African sample.
It is possible that measurement error in marital status is contributing to
the large fall in the marriage coefficient, but the conflation of married and
living together in the survey questionnaire removes the obvious source of
As expected, given the likely correlation between the time-invariant individual effects and the
explanatory variables, a Hausman test rejected the null hypothesis that there is no systematic
difiference between the coefficients from a random and fixed effects model (x^ = 783.22), suggesting
that a fixed effects model is more appropriate. We also tested for, but found no evidence of, serial
correlation among individual errors in the estimation.
Sample sizes in the LFS Panel are too small to test whether there are differences in the fixed
effects estimates for marriage among employees and the self-employed, and for other population
groups in South Africa. We find positive coefficients on marriage for these further estimations, but
the fixed effects estimates are not significant. We cannot exclude the possibility that this is because
of very small samples of switchers and therefore large standard errors in the estimations.
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TABLE 7
THE PROBABIUTY OF MARRIAGE AND EARNINGS GROWTH



















Source. LFS Panel (2001-4).
Note. The sample is restricted to employed black men
older than 20 years. The data are not weighted. Standard
errors are in parentheses. We excluded four outliers with
reported earnings growth, from September 2001 to Sep-
tember 2002, of 500% or more.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
reporting errors by respondents (see n. 3 for further discussion). The significant
fall in rhe marriage premium is also consistent with strong selection effects
on unobservable time-invariant characteristics, predicted by the practice of
bride wealth.
However, the fixed effects estimation does not eliminate the potential bias
that arises if there is a dynamic selection problem. If men with faster earnings
growth are selected into marriage because they are more able to afford ilobolo
payments, then the fixed effects estimate for marriage will still be biased
upward.
We investigate this potential source of endogeneity in marital status using
a probit regression to test whether the nature of earnings growth {^W) over
1 year of the panel influences the probability of marriage occurring (AM,) over
the remaining periods of the panel. We estimate:
Pr(AM,.) = a(AVt̂  + (pX,. + e,, (4)
where for a total T waves of the panel, starting in wave t, and for individual
/, AM; = Mjf — M;,+2 ( = 1 if the man married/started living together and
0 otherwise), AWf = {W-,+2 ~ ^Í,)I^Í,, and x, are individual characteristics (age
and years of schooling) in initial wave t. The sample in the estimation, therefore,
is all men who were present and employed for more than 1 year (or more than
three waves of the panel) and who were "never married" in the first year. This
restricts our sample size dramatically to only 243 individual men. Nonetheless,
as table 7 illustrates, we find that the estimated coefficient on earnings growth
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is positive and significant at the 5% level. Higher earnings growth in an earlier
period increases the probability of "marriage" in the subsequent period. Fur-
thermore, because we cannot identify switchers who change from living to-
gether to married, we may be underestimating the strength of this relationship.
The LFS Panel provides no family background or other variables with which
to instrument for marriage in the fixed effects estimation and, thereby, address
the problem of endogeneity.'' Although selection into marriage on the basis
of earnings growth will upwardly bias the fixed effects estimate of the marital
earnings premium, there remain numerous sources of downward bias in the
estimate that we also cannot control for. The most obvious comes from the
conflation of marriage and cohabitation. Where we are able to distinguish
between marriage and cohabitation at the cross section, we find significant
differences in the two coefficients: the marriage effect is large and positive,
but the cohabitation effect is not significantly different from zero.'^ To the
extent that this difference represents a true return to marriage over cohabitation,
rather than selection, our fixed effects estimate on the conflated category will
be biased downward.
We may also be underestimating any real effects of marriage on earnings
because we do not have information on the number of years married (or living
together). In the fixed effects model, the marriage premium is estimated on
the basis of changes in marital status over the course of the panel. Consequently,
marriage duration will be smaller for this group than for the average married
man. If the benefits to marriage accrue over time, then by not controlling for
years married, the marriage effect will be biased downward (Korenman and
Neumark 1991; Gray 1997; Stratton 2002; Ahituv and Lerman 2007). The
slightly larger coefficient obtained on the divorced/widowed dummy compared
to the married dummy in the fixed effects regression (reported in table 6) is
consistent with marriage's effects on wage rates continuing over the course of
marriage. The earnings advantage for men who became divorced or widowed
One possible instrument for marriage is local sex ratios (by district council), where we would
predict that in districts with higher ratios of unmarried females to males, the probability of men
marrying will also be higher. However, sample sizes by district council in the fiill LFS cross sections
are not sufficiently large to generate robust local sex ratios in South Africa over time. There is a
further concern that sex ratios may misrepresent the marriage market because of the prevalence
and nature of circular labor migration (Posel and Cásale 2003, 2006). Estimated sex ratios, which
can only be calculated using the available information on resident household members, may under-
represent the number of men available fot marriage in areas from which there is high male temporary
labor migration.
If we reestimate the OLS earnings regression using the LFS 2004:2, but combining married and
living together, the "marriage" effect falls from 0.208 to 0.117.
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over the panel is likely to reflect a longer period of marriage than that for the
group of individuals who became married over the 3-year period of the panel."
VI. Concluding Comments
Black men in South Africa who are married are estimated to earn about 23%
more at the cross section than men who have never married, after controlling
for a wide range of observable characteristics. The premium in a fixed effects
model, however, is considerably smaller (about 7%), suggesting larger selection
effects in South Africa than those typically found in developed countries.
Furthermore, unlike the few studies conducted for the United States, we find
evidence that the probability of marriage is positively related to the growth
in men's earnings in the preceding period. Our findings are consistent with
the payment of bride wealth in South Africa creating a barrier to marriage.
The additional source of endogeneity in marital status would suggest that
the small premium to marriage estimated in the fixed effects model is still
biased upward. However, there are good reasons to suspect that the fixed effects
estimator also has downward bias. Simple changes in the collection of data in
household surveys—ensuring that marriage and cohabitation are listed as two
distinct responses in a question on marital status, and including a question
on the number of years married—would eliminate these sources of downward
bias and would greatly increase what we can say about the economic returns
to marriage for men in South Africa.
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